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Abstract
The present paper estimates the e↵ects of welfare interventions on income inequality. We propose a the-
oretical model showing that welfare policies follow the median voter constituency regardless of whether
governments are center-left or center-right in the majority electoral system, whereas large di↵erences exist
between center-left and center- right coalitions in the proportional representation system. We exploit these
di↵erences in the mechanisms of welfare expenditure to estimate their elasticities on income inequality and
find that a 1% increase in government spending reduces the Gini income index by half a percentage point.
This result is robust under di↵erent compositions of expenditure, alternative imputation model specifications
and falsification tests.
Keywords: Welfare policies; Electoral rules; Income inequality; Instrumental variable approach; OECD
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1. Introduction
Income inequality has increased significantly in most countries over the past three decades. The rise was most
marked in the United States, where the share of the richest 1% in all pre-tax income has more than doubled
since 1980, reaching almost 20% in 2012. Top earners also fared very well in several other English-speaking
countries including Australia, Canada, Ireland and the United Kingdom. A striking change is also observed
in countries with a history of a more equal income distribution. Between 1980 and the late 2000s, the share
of the top 1% increased by 70% in Finland, Norway and Sweden, reaching around 7-8%. By contrast, top
earners saw their share grow much less in some of the continental European countries, including France, the
Netherlands and Spain (Bergh and Nilsson, 2010; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
2014).
Thus, an open question remains why rich OECD countries have significant long-term trends of unequal
income distribution. One strand of literature points to inadequate or ine cient government intervention in
the redistribution of resources (income) to the poor, which is typically measured as the di↵erence between
market and disposable income inequality at household level. While some early empirical investigations
including government spending as an explanatory variable for income distribution found an equalizing e↵ect
(Buliu and Gulde, 1995; Gustafsson and Johansson, 1999; Li et al., 2000; Schaltegger and Weder, 2014), the
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general trends in the 21st century were of cutbacks in welfare state generosity. This implies that benefit
replacement rates have been lower than predicted, allowing existing income transfer programs to blunt the
impact of rising earning inequality. These explanations can also be extended when we analyze the components
of welfare state transfers (Smeeding and Grodner, 2000; Hacker et al., 2005; Kenworthy, 2004; Smeeding,
2005), although when welfare state generosity includes the value of in-kind government and private services
such as health care and public education it tends to limit the level of bottom-end inequality in the United
States considerably (Adema and Ladaique, 2005; Garfinkel et al., 2006; Hacker, 2002).
Another strand of literature suggests that further mechanisms may explain why di↵erences in income dis-
tribution occur. Some authors have argued that some cultural and historical factors may play a role. In
particular, (Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2014) have investigated the causality between trust and equality, and the
potential role of welfare state policies as mediators of the causal associations. Instead, other authors have
recognized the importance of electoral systems in determining large di↵erences in welfare state policies and,
in turn, in income inequality (see for example Alesina and Glaeser 2005; Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002; Persson
and Tabellini 2005). It is a fact that the European countries, which are regulated by a proportional repre-
sentation system for most of the time, have been more prone to introducing redistributive policies, whereas
English-speaking countries, which tend to be regulated by majority electoral systems, are less inclined to
redistribute. Nevertheless, the electoral system interacts with the preferences of political parties emerging
from the elections results. Alesina et al. (1997); Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002); Persson and Tabellini
(2005) show that left-wing parties tend to spend and tax more than right-wing parties, and this di↵erence
can be particularly important in proportional representation systems in which it is easier for every group to
find a voice in Parliament. The distinction between left and right-wing parties, at least in the proportional
electoral formula, may become empirically relevant to explaining di↵erences in welfare policies.
The present paper shows theoretically how majority and proportional electoral systems a↵ect the redistribu-
tive policies and, in turn, income distribution. We extend the theoretical framework proposed by Iversen
(2005) and Iversen and Soskice (2006),and suggest that the electoral system induces changes in welfare pref-
erences when heterogeneous optimizing behaviors of ”winning” coalition are included. We find that both
left- and right-wing parties will follow the median voter constituency in the majority system, leading to sim-
ilar redistributive policies. Conversely, in the proportional representation system there is a large di↵erence
between center-left and center-right coalitions in the targeted policies.
We propose a structural model for empirical analysis based on a panel of 21 OECD countries for the 1995-
2010 period, and derived from the relevant inequality and welfare spending reduced forms, and test whether
and to what extent more generous welfare transfers are related to more equality in the distribution of
income. We exploit the outcome of the theoretical model suggesting that the interaction between the electoral
systems and the parties or coalition winning the elections generates exogenous cross-country di↵erences in
allocating welfare transfers which serves as an instrument to estimate welfare-inequality relationship. Thus,
an instrumental variable (IV) approach is applied in the empirical analysis.
The empirical results suggest that a larger budget for welfare state transfers is related to a lower income
inequality. More interestingly, the estimated elasticities indicate that a one percentage increase in welfare
transfers reduces the Gini index by about half a percentage point. When we extend the estimates for the
components of welfare, we still find that the dimension of the impact of ”not in kind” and ”in kind” transfers
and pensions is close to the aggregate result, and that these findings are robust even when the analysis is
performed for countries with high and low levels of income inequality or for time-varying sample analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the background and presents
the theoretical model, while in Section 3 we show the identification strategy and the resulting structural
equations. Section 4 then discusses the data set and the variables used. Section 5 presents the estimates,
whereas various checks of the robustness of the results are discussed in Section 6. Concluding remarks are
then presented in Section 7.
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2. Theoretical model
2.1. Background
A society of individuals i is assumed to be classified in three classes. These classes characterize the low-
income L, middle-income M and high-income H groups (Persson et al., 2003). It is also assumed that the
voting population is equally distributed between these three groups and that they have di↵erent preferences
about the relevant policy choices1. We consider an indirect utility function V i : Q! R in which Q is a set
of possible policy choices. Q includes qi 2 Q representing the subset of policies that maximize the value
of the indirect utility function of the group i, such that V i(qi)   V i(q), with the single-peaked preferences
assumption V i(q) strictly concave. Thus, transferring a given quantity of income from one group to another,
the indirect utility functions V i(qi) depends on the disposable income of each group (1   ⌧)yi and on the
transfers received by the group i from the government (i.e., Tri). The indirect utility function reads:
V i(qi) = (1  ⌧)yi + Tri (1)
where yi is the gross income of group i and ⌧ is a lump-sum tax on income (⌧  1).
In order to include the progressive taxation in the model, which characterizes the redistributive policy, we
follow Iversen (2005) in which transfers G represent a cost for the higher income groups M and H and a
benefit for the lower income group L. We also assume that these transfers are costly and are paid for a non
non-negligible share ✏ by people in M , and for the residual amount 1   ✏ by people in H. We assume an
upper limit G⇤ which is not modifiable without an agreement involving the financing groups. Furthermore,
a constant cost ↵ (↵ > 0) on G is assumed to characterize the administrative costs, which includes red-type
ones. This cost is not trivial, since it allows us to consider explicitly the measure of e ciency in the public
goods provided by the government.
Next, we assume that the government finances the expenditure by revenues ( i) for each group proportionally
by leaving a flat-rate income tax (⌧) and imposing the redistributive transfer policy discussed earlier. The
budget constraint rules are:
 L = ⌧yL (2)
 M = ⌧yM + (1 + ↵)✏G (3)
 H = ⌧yH + (1 + ↵)(1  ✏)G. (4)
Note that, the three income groups have di↵erent goals concerning G and ⌧ . Since progressive taxation is
assumed, the high income group will pay the largest amount of G without receiving any transfer (see equation
4). As a consequence, the optimal strategy for this group will be to reduce both G and ⌧ to zero. On the
other hand, the lower income group will receive the majority of transfers without paying G, and hence will
prefer setting G to G⇤ and ⌧ to 1. The middle income group, which is supposed to be equidistant between
the other groups has conflictual strategies concerning ⌧ and G. When ⌧ is considered, the preferences of M
are more in line with L, whereas its preferences are more closed to H when G is taken into account. In line
with Meltzer and Richard (1981), there is a positive e↵ect due to taxation which decreases by income and
M may gain an higher utility from a positive ⌧ . The optimality conditions for M will lead it to chose an
intermediate level of taxation ⌧⇤m (e.g., about 0.5) and to set G to zero. As it is clear by (3) and (4), when
✏ is negligible, H will pay the largest part of the cost of the redistributive policy and the preferences of M
and L will converge perfectly if ✏ = 0. Following these arguments, we can formalize the aims for each of the
three income groups as a function of G and ⌧ . For simplicity, we use the preferences v, expressed in terms
1Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) provides a version of the model in which there are only two groups of di↵erent size. In this
case the chosen redistributive policy depends by the size of each group and the growth rate of inequality across groups.
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of income shares, such that g = G/y and we obtain:
vL = g + ⌧ (5)
vM =  (⌧   ⌧⇤m)  g(1 + ↵)✏ (6)
vH =  ⌧   g(1 + ↵)(1  ✏) (7)
2.2. Modeling proportional representation
Intuitively, the basic model suggests that if one of the three income groups has the majority to be elected in
the country elections, it will impose its preferences concerning ⌧ and g upon the other groups. To define the
proportional representation system, we introduce two di↵erent sets of preference functions for the LM and
MH coalitions, respectively.
Coalition LM
(
vˆL = ⌧ + g   ⌧⇤m
vˆM = (1  ⌧⇤m)  (⌧   ⌧⇤m)  g(1 + ↵)✏ (8)
Coalition MH
(
vˆM =  (⌧   ⌧⇤m)  g(1 + ↵)✏
vˆH =  ⌧   g(1 + ↵)(1  ✏) (9)
Unlike equations 5, 6 and 7, we note that the preference functions in equations 8 and 9 depend on the
preferences of the counterpart. For example, lets denote by vˆLLM , the preferences of L when there is a
coalition between LM ; it includes ⌧ + g, which represents the preferences of the L and ⌧⇤m which is the
optimal tax rate for M . Since M prefers to set g = 0, ⌧⇤m is the only variable into the M part. By aiming
to find the solution of a multidimensional bargaining game, each group needs to satisfy the condition for
each coalition which is symmetric for each player.
For example, when we consider the coalition LM and L is the ”first player” the Rubinstein bargaining
solution is obtained equalizing own preference on choice variables (g, ⌧) with those of M . Technically this
implies substituting the key variables in the preference functions of each group with those of other group
forming the coalition and maximizing under this constraint. Following this scheme, L is available to contract
g and ⌧ which makes L willing to accept a coalition and vice versa. Summarizing, the pay-o↵s for each
coalition are as follow:
Coalition LM
8><>:
L play =)(1  ⌧⇤m)  (⌧L   ⌧⇤m)  [g⇤   gL(1 + ↵)✏ =
 
⇥
(1  ⌧⇤m)  (⌧M   ⌧⇤m)  [g⇤   gM (1 + ↵)✏⇤
M play =)⌧M + gM   ⌧⇤m =   ⇥⌧L + gL   ⌧⇤m⇤ (10)
Coalition MH
(
M play =)  ⌧M =   ⌧H
H play =)  (⌧H   ⌧⇤m) =   (⌧M   ⌧⇤m) (11)
where ⌧L, ⌧M and ⌧H are the preferred tax rates for each group and where   is a discount factor. Solving 10
and 11, we obtain a value of ⌧ and g that allows the players to set-up a given coalition. When    1, these
parameters read:
Coalition LM
n
⌧ = 1+⌧
⇤m
2   g2 + (1+↵)(g
⇤ g)✏
2 and g = g
⇤ (12)
Coalition MH
n
⌧ = ⌧
⇤m
2 and g = 0 (13)
where, (12) depends upon the cost of the redistributive policy ↵, the share of resources collected from the
middle-income group ✏ and by the values of transfers costs g, whereas (13) depends only upon the optimal
tax rate of the middle-income group. From the second condition, we find that in the coalition MH the tax
rate is half of the optimal tax rate forM and the middle-income group will obtain a constant utility from this
coalition that does not maximise its preferences. On the contrary, from the first coalition, we see that when
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g = g⇤, M l obtains a higher utility from the redistributive policy. To understand when the LM coalition
will be preferred to the MH, we run some comparative static on g, by introducing the optimal values of ⌧ ,
obtained by (12) in the preference function of the player M . The comparative statics reads:
Coalition LM
n
@VˆM
@g > 0 if ✏ <
1
1+↵
(14)
From (14), we see that M will obtain a positive utility from the redistributive policy, but that the share
of resources that M is willing to pay must not be higher than the inverse of the administrative costs for
the redistributive policy. When there are no administrative costs ↵ = 0, M will always obtain a positive
utility from the policy, but when these costs become relevant, individuals in groupM will be willing to pay a
lower amount of resources for policy. The progressiveness of the redistributive policy and the administrative
costs represent the crucial parameters in determining the coalition between low and middle income groups.
Table 1 summarizes the probabilities for a given coalition to win the elections, for di↵erent values of ✏ and
Table 1: Expected coalitions in a proportional representation system
Condition on ✏ Condition on ↵ Probability of LM coalition Tax system
If ✏ 0 ↵ 1 Pr(LM) 0
Strong progressive tax rate
If ✏ 0 ↵ 0 Pr(LM) 1
If ✏ 12 ↵ > 1 Pr(LM) 0 Progressive tax rate
If ✏ 12 ↵ < 1 Pr(LM) 1
If ✏ 1 ↵ > 0 Pr(LM) 0
Regressive tax rate
If ✏ 1 ↵ 0 Pr(LM) 1
↵. As shown by this Table, if the tax system is strongly progressive, we could expect a failure in the LM
coalition. Moreover, the administrative costs can determine di↵erent coalition and hence di↵erent welfare
policies. Following this scheme, we show that in a proportional representation system the coalition between
center-left parties is more probable than a coalition between center-right ones; also for given countries with
high administrative costs, a reverse probability can be found. Even more interesting, we show that targeted
redistributive policies di↵er, depending on whether a center-left or a center-right coalition is in charge.
2.3. Modeling the majority representation
The majority electoral system is characterized by a winner-take-all approach for a restricted number of
competing parties. We simplify the model by supposing that only a center-right CR and a center-left CL
political party can take part in the election. That is, in the majority electoral system each party needs to
attract the median income votes to win the elections, and, to do that, will converge to the policy preferences
of the median voter constituency that is {g, ⌧} = {0, ⌧⇤m}. As in proportional representation, the median
constituent shares with H the same preferences on g, but is more similar to L when ⌧ is considered. As a
consequence, H and L will converge yo the preferences of M, with corresponding preferences as in equation
(7).
When the government is in charge, the left- and right- wing parties have incentives to diverge by the median
income preferences, adopting policies that reflect their own constituency needs (Persson et al., 2003; Iversen,
2005). The median voter may reduce its own utility considerably but, at this stage, has no instruments to
influence the redistributive policy promoted by the government. We can summarize the costs of a deviation
from the electoral choice for the median voter as:
TCL = g
⇤ + ⌧⇤m (15)
TCH =  ⌧⇤m (16)
In turn, this deviation may reduce the credibility of the party, favoring a convergence with its own con-
stituency. The loss of reputation may be a matter for the government since it makes harder to deal with
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other agents. From another point of view, this credibility loss may reduce the possibility for the government
to build other policies diverging by the willing of its own constituency. These costs, defined by cCL and cCH ,
constitute the pay-o↵s for a political party to diverge from its electoral promises. Using this framework,
Table 2 summarizes the probabilities of a center-right and a center-left party winning the election. Under
Table 2: Expected probabilities for each party to be in charge in a majority system
Condition for CL Condition for CH Probability for CH win
If TCL < CCL TCH < CCH Indi↵erence between CL and CH
If TCL < CCL TCH > CCH Pr(CH) 1
If TCL > CCL TCH > CCH Pr(CH) 1
If TCL < CCL TCH > CCH Pr(CH) 0
this framework Iversen (2005) shows that the left party has a higher incentive to diverge from policies that
are unattractive for the median income constituency. In the majority electoral system the median-voter will
be less inclined to converge in a center-left party and, hence, the center-right party will win more often.
More interesting, the model shows that the policy promoted by the elected political party, following the
median constituency preferences, will be less redistributive than in a proportional representation system.
Also when a center-left party has the majority in a country, {g, ⌧} = {0, ⌧⇤m} target is chosen, since the
deviation from it will produce a loss of credibility for the left party with a pay-o↵ cCL. Consequently, when
a center-left or e center-right party wins the elections in a majority electoral system, the amount of welfare
benefits will always be lower than the ones provided in a proportional system, since both the coalitions will
converge to {g, ⌧} = {0, ⌧⇤m} target.
3. The identification strategy and the structural model
The theoretical model presented in the previous sections shows that the link between the electoral represen-
tation system and the share of resources devoted to welfare policies depends on the probability of a center-left
or a center-right party or coalition winning the elections. More in detail, we found that in countries reg-
ulated by a majority electoral system (MS), from a welfare perspective, it is indi↵erent which coalition
wins the elections whereas, in the proportional representation country, the center-left coalition (PSCL) will
redistribute more resources than the center-right coalition (PSCR). This structure can be used to estimate
the relation between welfare spending and income distribution, by controlling for potential endogeneity in
the inequality regression. Focusing upon welfare transfers, the cross-country relation between the specific
welfare policy and income inequality using the GINI indexes can be specified as:
Giniit = ↵1 + ↵2it + ↵3t + 1Wp
j
it +X
0
it 2 + vit (17)
where Giniit measures the income distribution by the disposable income for the country i in year t andWp
j
it
is the specific welfare policy j for the country i in year t. ↵2it and ↵3t are trends at country level and year
fixed e↵ects, respectively, and Xit is a vector of controls variables that will be described in the next section.
Equation 17 may have some identification and estimation issues. Indeed,Wpjit may be influenced by feedback
e↵ects, as increased income inequality may lead to increase welfare expenditures, or expectations of the
outcome of the process undertaken by the government to allocate expenditures may be correlated with
the current level of income inequality. Since welfare policies might be viewed as a mechanism to reduce
income inequality, the latter may induce policy-makers to increase welfare spending for high levels of income
inequality, i.e., reverse causality (see, for example, Niehues 2010; Doerrenberg and Peichl 2014). Thus,
welfare policy expenditure cannot simply be assumed to be exogenous, meaning that the empirical estimates
are not easy to interpret because there are potentially other factors at play.
6
To deal with this, an instrumental variable (IV) approach can be used to identify suitable instruments. In
the present context, we overcome this problem by using the main findings of the proposed theoretical model.
The interaction between the electoral representation system and the political parties or coalition winning the
elections is used as an instrument in this context, which characterizes the full set of preferences connected to
the welfare policies and includes the progressive taxation2. The results defines an empirical ordinal variable
ESW , which increases with respect to the propensity to consider welfare transfers. This variable ranges from
-1 to 1, where we encode:  1 countries with MS, 0 countries with (PSCR) and 1 countries with (PSCL).
Taking this IV approach, the inequality regression in the reduced form can be specified as:
Wpjit =  1 +  2it +  3t +  1ESWit +Xit 2 + uit (18)
Giniit =  1 +  2it +  3t + ⇠1ESWit +Xit⇠2 + zit (19)
where welfare coe cient on inequality policy spending j in (17) is recovered by the ratio of the reduced form
coe cients of ESW on Wp
j
it and Giniit, that is  1 = ⇠1/ 1.
4. Data and descriptive statistics
The present section provides a comprehensive description of data collected for 21 OECD countries in the1995-
2010 period. In the section, we provide an overview of the link between welfare spending and income
distribution, although special concern arises regard to the variable of income distribution, given the consistent
missing values in these series. Below, we will deal with these shortcomings by using the imputation methods
and show the consistency of these results by using the dataset with non-missing data.
4.1. Income inequality
Our measure of inequality is Giniit index measured by the disposable income which accounts for the e↵ect
of progressive taxation within income percentiles. We collect data from di↵erent sources. The first index is
extracted from the ”National Accounts” of the OECD statistics (GINIOECD); the second from the European
Institute of Statistics (GINIEurostat); and third from the ”GINI Growing Inequalities’ Impacts” (GINIGII),
a project financed by the European Union, which integrates o cial information with di↵erent data sources
derived from specific country statistics. Even if these three indexes are strongly correlated each other, they
di↵er substantially in terms of the number of missing values. We carried out our analyses using GINIGII ,
since it contains less missing data, while using the other indicators to implement imputation analysis and
extract some robustness. Below, we will return to the data description.
We apply a multiple imputation method proposed by King et al. (2001); Honaker and King (2010) which
uses the relevant information from the observed data to impute multiple values for each missing cell. This
approach is based on two principal assumptions. The first regards the complete dataset D. Let D =
{DOBS , DMIS} a nxk matrix partitioned into its observed and missing elements that includes all dependent
and explanatory variables and any other variable useful for the prediction of the missing values, with a
multivariate Normal distribution D ⇠ Nk(µ,⌃). The second assumption regards the pattern of missingness
that depends upon the observed dataset, DOBS , so that the data are missing randomly (MAR). Let M be
the missingness matrix, with the same dimension as D, with cells mij = 1 if the data in D is missing and
mij = 0 if otherwise. M can be predicted by DOBS . Formally:
p(M/D) = p(M/DOBS). (20)
2It is worth noting that this specification excludes the influence of omitted variable through the progressive taxation g, which
is a direct channel in a↵ecting welfare policies.
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Figure 1: Statistic checks for the imputed GINI index (GiniGII)
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We briefly describe the iterative procedure that allows us to determine multiple imputations in the Appendix.
An important point is that the missing values in the series of GINI indicators do not concern the same
countries in the same period. Thus, a set of related macroeconomic variables which contain a few missing
value as disposable income, growth rate of per-capita GDP and the share of total public spending in GPD
(extracted by OECD) are included. The expected correlation with the GINI indicators should contribute to
reproduce consistently missing data.
Although the multiple imputation involves imputingm values for each missing item and creatingm completed
data sets, it summarizes the matrix results in five independent series, obtained by a bootstrap replication
of the missing values. Following King et al. (2001), we will use one of these series (e.g., the third), for the
empirical analysis3, whereas the remaining four series will be used for robustness.
Figure 1 inspects the goodness of the imputed GINI index (GiniGII). Panel a) shows the relative density
of the imputed and original series; panel b) shows a falsification test which uses the imputation method
to replace each observation into the five series generated by the five models and investigates the distance
with the linear prediction (Abayomi et al., 2008). Both these checks confirm the robustness of the imputed
GiniGII , and specifically from the falsification test we find that variation across the imputations is small
enough that the use of the median operator is full consistent.
Figure 2 propose a first look into the graphical link between ESW and the temporal behavior of GiniGII .
The figure reports three di↵erent lines describing the mean value of the GINI index for the majority electoral
system and for center-right and center-left coalitions in a proportional electoral system. The figure illustrates
interesting regularities. Countries in a majority electoral system systematically have a higher value of the
unequal distribution, with a significant di↵erence with respect to the other electoral systems. In accordance
with the theoretical model proposed above, there is clearly a greater propensity in the proportional electoral
system - especially when the elections are won by a center-left government, to consider the detrimental e↵ects
of income inequality a priority.
3Following King et al. (2001), an analysis using 1000 imputed series, has been also used to ensure the constancy of imputed
values across di↵erent bootstrap replications. The results of this analysis are omitted since no relevant di↵erences are encountered
among the imputed series.
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Figure 2: Temporal behavior of the aggregate GINI index (GiniGII)
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4.2. Welfare expenditures
To characterize welfare policy interventions, we collected data from the National Accounts of the OECD,
extracting aggregate information about social benefits and distinguishing between ”in kind”, and ”not in
kind” social spending. Not in kind transfers (WpNIK) are typically cash and their use is indistinguishable
from income coming from other sources, whereas recipients of kind transfers (WpK) have no discretion
over their use (Lequiller and Blades, 2007). WpS is the aggregate welfare transfers. As in Garfinkel et al.
Table 3: Classification of social expenditure
Not in-kind In-Kind
Pension Early retirement pension, and other benefits Residential care, home-help services and other
benefits
Family Family allowances, maternity and parental
leave
Day care, home-help services and other benefits
Survivors Pension and other benefits Funeral expenses and other benefits
Incapacity related Disability pensions, pensions, paid sick leave,
other benefits
Residential care , home-help services, rehabili-
tation services and other benefits
Health - All services
Unemployment Unemployment compensation, severance pay
and early retirement for labour market reasons
Unspecified benefits
Housing - Housing assistance and other benefits
Other social policy areas Income maintenance and other benefits Social assistance and other benefits
(2006), we distinguish between in-kind and not in-kind transfers because it is of interest for policy-makers to
understand if di↵erent returns exist in terms of income inequality. Indeed, while the impact of not in-kind
transfers has been widely investigated (see for example Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Moller et al. 2003), the
literature contains little evidence on the e↵ects of in-kind transfers (exceptions are Garfinkel et al. (2006);
Sefton (2002); Lampman (1984)). We also consider benefits for old-age pensions, which represent one of the
main sources of not in-kind transfers in many countries. Table 3 labels welfare expenditures, whereas Table
4 lists the share of each expenditure in GDP by country. For example, we register that the Scandinavian
countries (Denmark, Sweden), which have the highest shares of welfare benefits (first column of Table 4),
spend considerably over an half of these transfers through in-kind benefits. Even if it is evidently a country-
based variability, the mean over the time span and country shows a range between 46% and 54% between
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”not in kind” and ”in kind” expenditures, irrespective of the type of the electoral system interacting with
the coalition that won the elections.
Table 4: Share of welfare transfers by country
Transfers
Country Total Not in-kind In-kind Old-pension ⇤
WpT WpNIK WpIK WpP
Austria 30.592 18.815 11.778 10.607
Belgium 28.463 15.163 13.301 7.153
Canada 22.218 10.503 11.715 3.947
Czech Republic 21.784 11.873 9.911 6.613
Denmark 33.636 16.761 16.875 7.513
Finland 30.523 16.798 13.725 8.340
France 31.687 17.478 14.209 10.893
Germany 28.949 17.463 11.486 8.640
Greece 25.678 15.559 10.119 10.273
Hungary 25.357 13.904 11.454 7.791
Ireland 20.889 10.025 10.864 3.067
Italy 26.989 16.281 10.708 11.313
Luxembourg 23.498 14.058 9.440 6.220
Netherlands 25.117 11.159 13.959 5.447
Portugal 23.658 12.536 11.122 7.727
Slovak Republic 21.539 12.993 8.546 5.673
Slovenia 26.098 15.321 10.777 9.614
Spain 22.051 12.126 9.926 7.253
Sweden 33.159 15.178 17.981 9.487
United Kingdom 23.972 12.718 11.254 5.733
United States . 11.684 . 5.320
MS 26.307 14.150 12.021 7.278
(PSCR) 25.414 13.843 11.295 7.224
(PSCL) 27.089 14.859 12.230 7.821
Notes: ⇤ MS is majoritarian electoral system; (PSCR) is the proportional system with centre-right
coalition (PSCR); (PSCL) centre-left coalition.
We also consider old age pension benefits which represent over a half of not in-kind transfers in the majority
of the countries considered. In pay-as-you-go systems, pensions may have important redistributive e↵ects
in favor of poor elderly people, because it may reduce the inequality of distribution of income between the
retirees (Heinrich, 2000) and the unequal distribution of earnings before retirement (Disney and Johnson,
2001; Alesina and Glaeser, 2005).
To provide a first impression of the relation between ESW and the allocation of welfare transfers, at the
bottom of the Table, we disentangle these policies between the two extremes of ESWit , that is, the center-
right coalition in a majority electoral system (MS)and proportional representation with a center-left coalition
(PSCL). The Table shows that the second case also includes almost 2% of welfare transfers, shared by the
components (about 1%) when each transfer is considered separately. Less evident di↵erences can be described
when we consider old-age pension benefits only.
4.3. Electoral systems, political variables and other controls
We extracted information characterizing the interaction between electoral system and political party orienta-
tion from the World Bank database of Political Institutions 2010 (WBPI2010) and considered the legislative
and executive indexes of electoral competitiveness establishing whether electoral representation is ”propor-
tional” or majority (Beck et al., 2001). The first system is characterized by the condition following which
the candidates are elected based on the percent of votes received by their political party. The latter is a
system in which legislators are elected using a winner-take-all or first past the post rule. Using this definition,
we include in the majority electoral system Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Italy, Korea, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom, United States and in the proportional representation system
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Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Sweden.
Secondly, we considered the party orientation. This variable is coded through the following criteria: i) right,
for parties that are defined as conservative, Christian Democratic, or right-wing; ii) left, for parties that are
defined as communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing, and iii) center, for parties that are defined as
centrist or when the party position can be described as centrist (e.g. party advocates strengthening private
enterprise in a social-liberal context). Hence, to characterize center-left and center-right coalitions, we also
collected information on the orientation of the parties, tha form the government majority.
Using this information, we set-up an ordered variable of the interaction variable between electoral system and
political party orientation (ESW ), which we defined in paragraph 3, with the restriction suggested through
the theoretical model of non-heterogeneous payo↵s targeted redistributive policies when the center-left and
center-right parties are in charge in a majority system.
From the same source of data we collected further information about the structure of government. As a
first degree of approximation, we set up three di↵erent dummy variables to distinguish when a nationalist,
regional-based and religious party supports the government. This variable allows us to improve the way in
which we characterize di↵erent identities that can constrain the welfare policy and that are not ascribable to
center-left and center-right coalitions (Alesina and Glaeser, 2005). In addition, we also consider how long the
present government is due to remain in o ce and the share of votes obtained into the last round of voting.
To complete the dataset, we extracted the growth rate of pollution, the growth rate of per-capita GDP,
the share of public spending in GDP and the World Bank government e↵ectiveness index from the OECD
National Accounts. The first series was used to account for di↵erences in demographic pressure between
countries while the growth rate of per-capita GDP accounts for the economic trends of each country and
also acts as a control for the e↵ect of the economic crisis that has taken place in many countries from 2006.
Considering government spending as a share of GDP is useful to account for the size of the government and
as a proxy of total taxation. Finally, the World Bank government e↵ectiveness index is able to capture for
di↵erences between countries with regard to the services provided to citizens and is a proxy of the cost of
government intervention.
5. Results
Table 5 presents the estimates in equation (18) of the correlations between electoral system interacted with
the preferences of political parties (ESW ) and welfare expenditure, which includes time trends for each
country, time fixed e↵ects and the set of country covariates described in the previous section. We analyse
the magnitude of this correlation for the share of welfare transfers (WpT ), for the components of ”not in-
kind” (WpNIK) and ”in-kind” (WpIK) expenditure and for the specific expenditure related to ”old age
pension benefits” (WpP ).
The first column of Table 5 shows a significant and positive correlation between ESW and WpT . Given
the ESW ordering, the significant positive e↵ect of the parameter means that (PSCL) provides a significant
grater amount of public resources to redistributive policies with respect to the other electoral-government
combinations. Disentangling this expenditure by considering in-kind and not in-kind transfers, we also find
a significant correlation of ESW in both transfers (columns II and III). This result is confirmed in the last
column of the table. Fostered by the proportional system with center-left coalition we have a significant
increase in old age pension benefits.
Table 6 reports the correlation between ESW and income inequality indicator (GINIGII) (equation 19).
The three columns of the Table compare the naive model (column I), with the one that also includes fixed
e↵ects (column II) and models estimated with fixed e↵ects and the country covariates (column III). The
comparison shows that the linear fit of the model (Adjusted R2) strongly increased with the inclusion of
fixed e↵ects and covariates. More interesting, the presence of a proportional system, with a center-left
government significantly linked with a country-wide reduction of income inequalities, which supports our
contention relative to this political party’s greater attention to inequality.
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Table 5: Reduced form estimates of the relationship between electoral representation system and parties winning the elections
and welfare transfers (Equation 18)
Transfers Benefit
Total Not in-kind In-kind Old-age pension
(Wpt) (WpNIK) (WpIK) (WpP )
ESW 3.358 *** 1.852 *** 1.506 *** 0.724 ***
(0.374) (0.265) (0.209) (0.195)
Time trend yes yes yes yes
Fixed e↵ects yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.793 0.724 0.842 0.818
N 282 282 282 275
Notes: ESW is the interaction variable between the electoral representation system and the political parties or coali-
tion winning the elections. The robust standard error are shown in brackets. The asterisks give p-value significance
levels: ⇤ p < 0.1; ⇤⇤ p < 0.05; ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
Table 6: Reduced form estimates of the relationship between electoral representation system and parties winning the elections
and GINI index (Equation 19)
GiniGII GiniGII GiniGII
I II III
ESW -1.546 *** -1.535 *** -1.549 ***
(0.236) (0.252) (0.370)
Time trend no yes yes
Fixed e↵ects no yes yes
Covariates no no yes
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.701 0.745
N 282 282 282
Notes: ESW is the interaction variable between the electoral representation system
and the political parties or coalition winning the elections. The robuts standard error
are shown in brackets. The asterisks give p-value significance levels: ⇤ p < 0.1; ⇤⇤ p <
0.05; ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
Table 7 lists the IV estimates of the structural welfare expenditure-income inequality model. Each spec-
ification includes time trends for each country, time fixed e↵ects and the set of country covariates. From
a first comparison across the columns of Table 7, we can see that the proposed specifications provide a
fairly good approximation of the linear link between income distribution and the di↵erent welfare transfers
considered. Note that the reduced-form estimates provide a check for the IV method in the form of the
structural parameter estimate. For example, when social transfers in aggregate is accounted, the coe cient
 1 = ⇠1/ 1 is equal to the ratio of the reduced form parameters in equation (19) and (18), respectively (i.e.,
 1.546/3.358 =  0.461).
For each specification, we test for weak instruments. Below the Table we report the first stage F-statistics
and Wald statistics based on Cragg and Donald (1993) and the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) generaliza-
tion to non-independently and non-identically distributed errors, along with the associated p   values for
weak-instruments hypothesis tests (Bazzi and Clemens, 2013). The tests support the choice concerning the
instrument variable excluding that estimates may be somewhat biased toward ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995; Staiger and Stock 1997).
However, we are interested in comparing the impact of social expenditure with that of the components
because we want to test if the composition of welfare transfers a↵ects income inequality. Since all the
expenditures are measured as shares with respect to GDP, we use the elasticities of these relationships which
we list below the estimated parameters in bold character. A percentage increase of welfare transfers leads
to a 0.43 percentage point reduction in income inequality. This estimated elasticity is close to the results
obtained from in-kind (0.43) and not in-kind (0.42) transfers as also shown by the confidence intervals of the
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Table 7: Estimates of structural parameters and elasticities of the relationship between welfare transfers and GINI index (IV
estimates; instrument: ESW )
GiniGII GiniGII GiniGII GiniGII
I II III IV
Wptot -0.461 ***
(0.094)
-0.430 ***
[0.087]
Wpnik -0.836 ***
(0.181)
-0.425 ***
[0.092]
Wpik -1.028 ***
(0.233)
-0.438 ***
[0.099]
Wpp -1.916 ***
(0.590)
-0.519 ***
[0.161]
Time trend yes yes yes yes
Fixed e↵ects yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.804 0.790 0.744 0.596
N 282 282 282 275
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic† 67.967 41.370 43.873 11.665
(0.000) (0.000) ( 0.000) (0.001)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 114.610 61.838 90.398 18.495
(0.000) (0.000) ( 0.000) (0.001)
Notes: ESW is the interaction variable between the electoral representation system and the political parties or coalition winning the elections.
The elasticities are shown in bold. The robust standard error are listed in brackets. The asterisks give p-value significance levels: ⇤ p <
0.1; ⇤⇤ p < 0.05; ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. We report first stage F-statistics and Wald statistics based on Cragg and Donald (1993) and the Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) generalisation to non-independently and non-identically distributed errors, along with the associated p   values for weak-
instruments hypothesis tests (Bazzi and Clemens 2013). † Confidence intervals for the Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic follow Bazzi and
Clemens (2013).
estimates. This may imply that while it is known that the components of government expenditures have a
di↵erent productivity in growth rate and reduce their returns if the share of government expenditure increases
(Barro, 1990, Devarajan et al. 1996), the e↵ect of welfare expenditure shares on income inequality seems to
be linked with the proportional propulsive mechanism generating disposable income. This statement seems
to be confirmed in the old pension component. Although it is estimated a large e↵ect by the parameter of
this specific share on income inequality, the impact on GINI indicator is close to the aggregate e↵ect when
the elasticity is estimated.
5.1. Country’s heterogeneous e↵ects
As shown in the previous section, there is no di↵erential impact within the components of welfare expenditure
on the income inequality indicator, since all the estimated elasticities rely on the confidence interval of WpT .
Table 9 below replicates the estimation results proposed in Table 7, where we compare countries with a GINI
index above and below the mean of the OECD sample. As a general result, a comparison between the two
sub-samples shows that the e↵ect of welfare spending is roughly doubled when countries with high income
distribution are analyzed, and that there is an elasticity of about -0.5 (p   value < 1%) with respect to
an elasticity of a lower income distribution of -0.27. A similar outcome is also found when we distinguish
between in-kind and not in-kind transfers, while there is less di↵erence between elasticities when old age
pension benefits are analyzed. However, this variability is not su cient to undermine our conclusions because
confidence intervals at 95% significant level overcomes all the points estimate.
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Table 8: Welfare transfers and GINI index: heterogeneous e↵ects
GiniGII
High Low High Low High Low High Low
inequality inequality inequality inequality inequality inequality inequality inequality
sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample
WpT -0.616 *** -0.259 **
(0.129) (0.118)
-0.503 *** -0.274 **
[0.105] [0.124]
WpNIK -1.389 *** -0.617 *
(0.327) (0.345)
-0.606 *** -0.358 *
(0.143) (0.200)
WpIK -1.107 *** -0.446 **
(0.242) (0.184)
-0.421 *** -0.214 **
(0.092) (0.088)
WpP -1.507 *** -1.411
(0.257) (0.981)
WpP -0.356 *** -0.440
(0.061) (0.306)
Fixed e↵ects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.798 0.637 0.725 0.521 0.791 0.651 0.727 0.292
N 141 141 141 141 141 141 135 140
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic† 13.089 35.072 7.658 10.648 19.933 30.515 16.185 6.093
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004 (0.001 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014
Cragg-Donald F statistic 33.668 45.759 17.133 15.871 50.357 42.068 30.766 10.657
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004 (0.001 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014
Notes: ESW is the interaction variable between the electoral representation system and the political parties or coalition winning the elections. The elasticities are shown in bold. The robust standard error are listed in
brackets. The asterisks give p-value significance levels: ⇤ p < 0.1; ⇤⇤ p < 0.05; ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. We report first stage F-statistics and Wald statistics based on Cragg and Donald (1993) and the Kleibergen and Paap
(2006) generalisation to non-independently and non-identically distributed errors, along with the associated p   values for weak-instruments hypothesis tests (Bazzi and Clemens 2013). † Confidence intervals for the
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic foolow Bazzi and Clemens (2013).
6. Robustness analysis
In this section we explore the robustness of the results. The initial check, we show how the estimates of
the structural model may change when imputation models are used, since, as discussed early, imputation
models use di↵erent independent bootstrap replication (King et al., 2001). Figure 3 shows the estimated
parameters for the GINIGII and the corresponding confidence intervals for the five imputed series using the
welfare transfer variables presented in Table 7. We find small changes in the parameter magnitude and signs
of the estimated relationship are in accordance with those in Table 7, showing the goodness of the proposed
imputation method.
As a second robustness check, we show the stability of our results with respect to di↵erent time spans. This
analysis has a two-fold aim. One the one hand, we test if our estimates are time-dependent and, on the other
hand, we investigate whether the results are driven by the economic crisis that has taken place in many of the
analyzed countries since 2008. For this purposes, Figure 4 reports the estimated parameter of equation two
as in Table 7 for each considered welfare transfer. The time intervals considered are: i) 1997-2010, ii) 1996-
2010, iii) 1995-2010, iv) 1995-2009, v) 1995-2008 and vi) 1995-2007. Again, the horizontal lines describe the
coe cients in 7, whereas the vertical lines show the confidence interval of each estimated parameter. As in
the previous case, the estimates are robust across di↵erent time intervals and always statistically significant.
Note also that when the sample is restricted to 2007, thus excluding the possible e↵ect of the economic crisis,
we do not find any di↵erences in the estimated parameters.
We are also aware that the imputation method may lead to a bias in the studied relationship. Although
we cannot correct it because in principle we should include predictors which forecast the lack of an income
inequality index perfectly, we can propose a restricted estimation which use non-imputed data. Table 10 lists
the estimated parameters and elasticities. Even if the estimated e↵ects of the welfare transfer elasticities are
significant and pervasively lower, we note that they are not di↵erent to the ones found in the benchmark
model.
Finally, Table 10 replicates the specifications reported in Table 7 by using the GINI index extracted from
the National Accounts of the OECD (GINIOECD). Unlike the (GINIGII), this index has the advantage of
usinga more homogeneous source of information, although the exclusion of supplementary surveys to obtain
this index determines more missing, and in turn, more imputed values in the series.
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Figure 3: Estimates of the relationship between welfare transfers and GINI index for di↵erent imputed models
-1
.5
-1
-.5
0
.5
Sp
to
t
1 2 3 4 5
subgroupl1
-1
.5
-1
-.5
0
Sp
nik
1 2 3 4 5
subgroupl1
-2
.7
-1
.7
-.7
.3
Sp
ik
1 2 3 4 5
subgroupl1
-3
.5
-2
.5
-1
.5
-.5
Sp
p
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5
The estimates in Table 10 are in accordance with the ones presented above, even if the magnitude is higher
than in the previous case. All the parameters and elasticities are significant at a 99% confidence interval.
The more remarkable point estimates emerging from the Table derive from old age pension benefits. In this
case, we find that a response of a 1% change in this component of not kind welfare leads to a 0.75 percent
reduction in income inequality of, although once again it overlaps the confidence interval with that of the
benchmark model.
7. Concluding remarks
The present paper contributes to the debate concerning the e↵ects of the welfare spending on income in-
equalities. We develop a theoretical model to extract di↵erent mechanisms in which institutional (electoral)
system and political representativeness lead the allocation of expenditure. Di↵erences in the welfare policies
are, hence, explainable through the probability of a center-left or a center-right coalition winning elections.
Our model suggests that a majority electoral system produces similar redistributive strategies, whereas
di↵erences arising from center-left and center-right coalitions in the proportional representation system.
We exploit this exogenous variation in the allocation of welfare transfers across countries to estimate the
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Figure 4: Estimates of the relationship between welfare transfers and GINI index for di↵erent time span
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welfare-inequality relationship in a panel of OECD countries in causal terms. The empirical results suggest
that a larger burden in transfers is related to lower levels of income inequality. Most interestingly, the
estimated elasticities indicate that a one percentage increase in welfare transfers reduces the Gini index by
about half percentage point, regardless of whether we use imputed or non-imputed data. When we perform
the estimates for the components of welfare, we still find that the dimension of the impact of not in kind,
in kind transfers and pensions is close to the aggregate result. This result is found to be robust also when
the analysis is restricted in order to distinguish countries with high and low levels of income inequality. Also
while we find that the e↵ect of welfare transfers is roughly doubled in countries with high income inequality,
the estimated elasticity measures for in-kind and not in-kind benefits, in both the samples considered, rely
on the confidence interval of the aggregate spending.
While it is intuitively plausible that the political instruments is exogenous, it must also satisfy the exclusion
restriction: shocks due to the center-left or center-right government in di↵erent electoral systems should
a↵ect income inequality only through welfare transfers. We acknowledge the possibility that transmission
channels other than welfare transfers per se (i.e., interaction between center-left coalitions and unions)
may be key underlying causes of income inequality in the aftermath of electoral systems and coalitions. The
corporatist nature of labor market institutions and the close interaction between unions and left-wings parties
in many OECD countries favor labor market agreements with business organisations, focused in particular
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Table 9: Estimates of the relationship between welfare transfers and GINI index, non imputed data (IV estimates; instrument:
ESW )
GINIGII GINIGII GINIGII GINIGII
I II III IV
WpT -0.447 ***
(0.133)
-0.420 ***
[0.125]
WpNIK -0.839 ***
(0.256)
-0.423 ***
[0.129]
WpIK -0.956 ***
(0.313)
-0.418 ***
[0.137]
WpP -1.194 **
(0.511)
-0.324 **
[0.139]
Time trend yes yes yes yes
Fixed e↵ects yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.810 0.784 0.788 0.716
N 228 228 228 225
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic† 32.587 18.436 31.026 10.759
(0.000) (0.000) ( 0.000) (0.001)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 61.090 32.805 63.939 26.808
(0.000) (0.000) ( 0.000) (0.001)
Notes: ESW is the interaction variable between the electoral representation system and the political parties or coalition winning the
elections. The elasticities are shown in bold. The robust standard error are listed in parenthesis. The asterisks give p-value significance
levels: ⇤ p < 0.1; ⇤⇤ p < 0.05; ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. We report first stage F-statistics and Wald statistics based on Cragg and Donald
(1993) and the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) generalisation to non-independently and non-identically distributed errors, along with the
associated p values for weak-instruments hypothesis tests (Bazzi and Clemens 2013). † Confidence intervals for the Kleibergen-Paap
F test statistic follow Bazzi and Clemens (2013).
to blue-collar workers, which are addressed to enhance redistributive policies. Unfortunately, we do not have
reliable cross-country data on these other intermediate channels. There are, however, unionisation figures
for approximately half of our sample period from the OECD, and we find that center-left government in
di↵erent electoral systems is not significantly associated with unions, indicating that the strength of unions,
when left-wings parties are at government, are unlikely to be driving our findings4.
Another serious violation of the exclusion restriction is the possibility that the type of electoral system
might directly a↵ect income inequality independently of welfare conditions. For instance, net of the welfare
magnitude and proportions, a large number of political parties in a proportional representation system may
reduce the quality of the services provided by the government, given a likely growing ine ciency in the
decision-making process. Note that this possibility is not a serious threat to our estimation strategy, since
the proportional electoral system is empirically associated with significantly less income inequality in the
reduced-form regressions. Thus to the extent that the hypothesised bias exists, our estimates would be lower
bounds on the true impact of welfare spending on income inequality. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that
we are unable to definitively rule out the possibility that electoral systems and coalitions could have some
independent impact on income distribution beyond its impact working through welfare transfers, though we
believe that these other e↵ects are likely to be minor.
4Results are available upon request.
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Table 10: Estimates of the relationship between welfare transfers and income inequality, GiniOECD (IV estimates; instrument:
ESW )
GiniOECD GiniOECD GiniOECD GiniOECD
I II III IV
WpT -0.608 ***
(0.100)
-0.657 ***
[0.078]
WpNIK -1.103 ***
(0.210)
-0.728 ***
[0.127]
WpIK -1.356 ***
(0.242)
-0.591 ***
[0.085]
WpP -3.061 ***
(0.875)
-0.754 ***
[0.274]
Time trend yes yes yes yes
Fixed e↵ects yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.791 0.760 0.720 0.283
N 282 282 282 275
Kleibergen-Paap F test statistic† 31.146 16.711 28.010 5.671
(0.000) (0.000) ( 0.000) (0.001)
Cragg-Donald F statistic 61.787 26.730 90.294 13.302
(0.000) (0.000) ( 0.000) (0.001)
Notes: ESW is the interaction variable between the electoral representation system and the political parties or coalition winning the
elections. The elasticities are shown in bold. The robust standard error are listed in parenthesis. The asterisks give p-value significance
levels: ⇤ p < 0.1; ⇤⇤ p < 0.05; ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. We report first stage F-statistics and Wald statistics based on Cragg and Donald
(1993) and the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) generalisation to non-independently and non-identically distributed errors, along with the
associated p values for weak-instruments hypothesis tests (Bazzi and Clemens 2013). † Confidence intervals for the Kleibergen-Paap
F test statistic follow Bazzi and Clemens (2013).
Appendix A: Multiple imputation.
Analyzing data with missing values is a serious problem in many fields especially in economic and social
sciences, where the researchers deal with cross sectional, time series or time series cross sectional (TSCS)
datasets.
Briefly we describe the iterative procedure that allows us to make multiple imputations in our paper following
King et al. (2001); Honaker and King (2010). If the assumption of missing randomly (MAR) held and
missingness matrix (M) doesn’t depend on ✓ = (µ,⌃) we can write the following expression:
p(DOBSM/✓) = p(DOBS/⌧)p(M/✓) (21)
and derive the likelihood function of the observed data:
L(✓/DOBS) / p(DOBS/✓) (22)
Moreover the multiple imputation allows us to incorporate knowledge via prior function on individual missing
cell values. If, for example, a flat prior on ✓ is assumed, the posterior function is defined as p(✓/DOBS) /
p(DOBS/✓) =
R
p(D/✓)dDMIS . In order to draw from this posterior, Honeker et al. (2010) propose the use
of a combination of a Expectation maximization (EM) algorithm, Dempster et al. (1977), with a bootstrap
technique called EMB algorithm that works as follows. For each step m samples of size n with replacement
from our dataset D are bootstrapped and then the EM algorithm is applied to find the posterior mode for
bootstrapped data in order to obtain a punctual estimation for ✓. Then imputations are made for each
set of estimates by drawing values of DMIS from its distribution conditioned on DOBS . The result is m
multiple datasets that can be used for subsequent analyses. If the use of bootstrapping methods occurs
under regularity conditions, the bootstrapped estimation of ✓ has the correct properties.
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